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In considering the future of OSS and current operations against Japan, it is believed that some thought must be given to the organization's general position in the opinion of other Government Agencies, Capitol Hill and the American Public. At first glance it would seem an anomaly that a clandestine service should have to consider its public relations, but such is the way of our way of Government. Certain parallels can be seen immediately which are worth considering. The most outstanding example is the FBI. This organization from a position of relative obscurity suddenly blossomed forth as a national and international institution under the directorship of J. Edgar Hoover and his flair for publicity starting with the post World War I gangster era. Well managed publicity in the late twenties and early thirties placed the Bureau in an unassailable position in the public favor above and beyond politics. This has resulted in not only adequate appropriations but real congressional power which gives the Bureau considerable freedom from interference by other government agencies of the executive branch. It is significant to note however, that this publicity in no way affects either the Bureau's efficiency or Security. In fact directly the reverse is the case. With the strengthening of its political position the Director was able to adopt personnel and administrative policies of a more stringent nature that it is possible for most Federal Agencies to exercise.

During the same period as the Bureau's phenomenal expansion the Secret Service, the Federal Narcotics Bureau, O.N.I., and M.I.S. had distinctly hard sailing. Frequent reorganizations were in order, appropriations were pared to the bone and administrative efficiency was impaired.

The OSS at its inception adopted not only a sound, but in fact, the only possible public relations policy at the time - no public relations, complete security blackout and a resultant "hush hush" attitude which was distinctly intriguing to Washington and the public at the time. It is felt however, that with the close of the European War, with postwar planning very much to the fore, and the future of OSS decidedly in doubt, that the time has come for a direct reversal of policy. It is believed that the case of the FBI is a good enough example to prove that it is possible to have good public relations and still have excellent security - it is merely a matter of selection of material and sound exploitation policies. (In this connection it is also interesting to note that the State Department has at last abandoned its traditional fear of public relations - a fear principally based on the security angle - and is now in the process of building a large and complicated public relations department with which to implement its program both at home and abroad.) The current "hush hush" policy of OSS has long outworn its usefulness. It has caused, after the early days, an increasing irritation on the part of other government officials and has at last spread widely enough to become a sufficiently general irritant to impede operations in many parts of the world.

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Many tales and anecdotes of an unfavorable nature to OSS which are recounted in all parts of the world come from members of other Intelligence organizations who are active in pointing out that OSS duplicates their work and frequently reports upon matters already taken care of by other organizations. This duplication bogey is one which has been capitalized upon in the I-B Theater by members of the command staff greatly to the detriment of OSS. In almost all cases it is completely unfounded and is pure rumor. Obviously it would not be practicable, diplomatic, or within the dignity of OSS to attempt to scotch these multiple rumors individually. Each in itself is relatively unimportant. The important thing is that a distinctly unfavorable climate of opinion is being created about OSS - a climate of opinion which needs to be immediately changed for the better.

It is believed that the time has now arrived for OSS to inform the Government and the people which it serves, covering the accomplishments and successes it has had in the European and Mediterranean Theaters, and to a minor degree in currently active theaters consistent with rigid security. The development of a favorable climate of opinion about OSS should be neither a very difficult nor lengthy task. It is believed that a very good start could be made in two to three months.

It is suggested therefore that a public relations program be instituted by OSS along the following lines:

1. That the personality of the Director be played up in class publications and two or three press conferences. This is suggested because the personality of the Director may be used without violation of security. The F.B.I. have successfully used the personality of Mr. Hoover as a vehicle for carrying information about the Bureau. In a very real sense his personality has provided "cover" for many individuals working under him. From time to time the Director of OSS should announce certain items - such as the total number of spies apprehended by X-2; a particularly daring raid accomplished sometime in the past, etc. etc. The fact that most of our expenditures are being placed upon vouchered funds, when they don't have to be, is an extremely important news fact. Very shortly a number of decorations will be awarded to personnel from the ETO and the MEIC. These should be awarded under proper auspices by the Director and properly played up. Many members of Naval Intelligence have been given awards publicly but special citations consistent with security have been prepared for press purposes. The number of regular Army officers holding key positions in the OSS is a valuable item in establishing the feeling of professional competence.

2. There are of course numerous OSS stories which will make excellent magazine material without the slightest danger of violation of security at the present time. The story of Peter Thomkins and the history of Max Corvo are examples of the kind of story which would receive wide and popular acceptance. Obviously neither of these men can be used for postwar cover

intelligence work as they are extremely well known to the intelligence services of several nations.

3. It is believed that it would be extremely advantageous to have schools and training and visual presentation organize a series of brief half-hour seminars in the principles of intelligence for government officials and members of Congress. The subject has enough appeal to everybody that attendance could be guaranteed. It would have the psychological advantage of seeming to take the participants "in the know", while at the same time, the methods and techniques shown could be limited to the standard ones known and used by intelligence organizations of all nations. This course would make a really positive contribution to government in that it would accomplish a threefold mission - make government officials security conscious, make them appreciate and use the product of intelligence, and give them an insight into the value of OSS. In the case of Congress, the courses could be held on the Hill.

4. A rough survey of some one hundred professional intelligence and military publications carrying intelligence material discloses practically no articles for which OSS is given credit. This internal "house organ" field is one of considerable importance. Practically all these publications are classified and offer an excellent opportunity for making OSS's contribution in intelligence better known. It is suggested that this field should be carefully examined and efforts made to increase OSS coverage of this medium for the dissemination of intelligence information.

5. It is believed that a book or two might be authorized by the Director to be written by member of the organization whose basic functions are closing. An example of this type of work is seen in W. Somerset Maugham's "Ashenden". "Ashenden" has enjoyed wide popularity, is part of the curriculum of SIS, and still discloses practically nothing of an operational nature. Major Nicol Smith is well qualified to turn out this type of work.

6. Field Photographic has produced thousands of feet of film of OSS activities. The Army Signal Corps puts out weekly films called "Staff Reports" which are classified "Secret" and which are shown to military staffs all over the world. It is strongly recommended that OSS footage be included in some of these "Staff Reports". Inclusion of OSS material would greatly strengthen OSS relationships with military staffs. It is also suggested that a special secret staff film be prepared in cooperation with the Army and Navy giving a brief but dramatic orientation to the objectives of OSS. This film to be shown in the various war rooms of the Theaters of Operations down to the regimental level. Indoctrination of this sort would have immediate results at the staff level in facilitating procurement of supplies, transportation, and hundreds of special requests which a clandestine organization has to continually make upon the regular services.

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The implementation of a program as outlined above is a relatively simple matter. It would be obviously bad public relations to use the term "public relations" or to be too obvious as to objectives. It is suggested therefore the program be administered by a Special Assistant to the Director. The principle release of news would be through the "plant" system and the encouragement of high grade writers to work up the raw material provided them by OSS. This method has the advantage of greater media acceptability while at the same time keeping OSS staff personnel for this type of work to the minimum. It is believed the maximum staff required would be three, and of this number, one would be in travel status most of the time. It is furthermore suggested that one method of starting such an operation immediately without being too obvious on the Washington scene at the outset would be to feed some of the basic raw material from Europe to the media representatives now in Europe so that the final release will have an European date line and give relatively old material a flavor of being really quite recent.

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